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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Section 78-2(a)-3(h), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
POINT I 
THIS COURT HAS PREVIOUSLY RULED THAT 
THESE STATUTES ARE CONSTITUTIONAL. 
POINT II 
THE "DEDICATION BY USE" STATUTES, SECTION 
27-12-89 AND 90, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, DO NOT 
EFFECT AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING VIOLATING 
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 22 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
RECITATION OF THE STATUTES INVOLVED 
Section 27-12-89: 
"Pubiic use constituting dedication. 
A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and 
abandoned to the use of the public when it has been 
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period 
of ten years .ft 
Section 27-12-90: 
"Highways Once Established Continue Until Abandoned. 
All public highways once established shall continue to 
be highways until abandoned or vacated by order of the 
highway authorities having such jurisdiction over any 
such highway, or by other competent authority." 
Section 27-12-2(6): 
"Highway means any public road, street, alley, lane, 
court, place, viaduct, tunnel, culvert, bridge, or 
structure laid out or erected for public use, or 
dedicated or abandoned to the public, or made public in 
an action for the partition of real property, including 
the entire area within the right-of-way." 
2 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Prior to the trial court's final decision, Judge Hadfield 
entered an Order Denying Appellees' Request for Partial Summary 
Judgment on the issue of the constitutionality of the two 
statutes in question. Record, Pages 164-175. Appellees raised 
the issue on appeal in their brief. 
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
The Trial Court issued a Memorandum Decision denying 
Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment. Record, Pages 164-175. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
See the earlier briefs filed by Appellant and Appellees. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. This Court has already ruled on this issue in a 1996 
case (Kohler v. Martin), finding a claim of unconstitutionality 
to be without merit. 
2. Statutes are presumed to be valid. These statutes do 
not constitute or cause any taking or regulation which is 
compensable under either the U.S. or Utah Constitutions. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT HAS PREVIOUSLY RULED THAT 
THESE STATUTES ARE CONSTITUTIONAL. 
In Kohler v. Martin, 916 P2d 910 (Utah App. 1996), this 
Court decided the very issue raised by Appellees in their Reply 
Brief. 
In Kohler, two private parties were disputing the use and 
ownership of a driveway. 
The trial court found that the driveway was actually 
included in a roadway which was in turn a public thoroughiare. 
The trial court also made rulings regarding the existence of a 
private prescriptive easement. 
On appeal, numerous issues were raised for review, but the 
Appellate Court only reached two of those issues, those being (1) 
whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that the roadway 
was a public thoroughfare pursuant to Section 27-12-89, and (2) 
whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that the entire 
parcel of property involved had been dedicated to the public. 
The Appellate Court ruled that the trial court properly 
concluded a public roadway had been created pursuant to said 
statute, reversed the trial court concerning the existence of 
private easements, then remanded for a determination of the 
necessary and reasonable width of the public roadway. 
One of the issues raised in Martin concerned the 
constitutionality of Section 27-12-89. In a footnote, on Page 
912 of the opinion, the Court stated as follows: 
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"We do not address Martin's arguments regarding joinder 
and the alleged violation of Article I, Section 22 of 
the Utah Constitution. Martin has not demonstrated 
that the trial court abused its discretion in failing 
to grant the motion for joinder of Midway City. 
Further, the argument regarding the unconstitutional 
taking is entirely without merit and need not be 
addressed." (Kohler, Page 912, Footnote #1; emphasis 
added.) 
Appellees raised the same issue in the instant case, 
although they additionally challenged the constitutionality of 
said Section 27-12-90. However, the basis for the challenge is 
the same, and Appellees make no distinction between the two 
statutes. Therefore, if Section 27-12-89 is constitutional, so 
is Section 27-12-90. 
Appellees' challenge is raised under the same Article I, 
Section 22 of the Utah Constitution dealt with summarily in 
Martin. Admittedly, Appellees also raise the challenge under the 
Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, but the issue is the 
same, and the language of the two constitutional provisions is 
virtually the same. 
Appellees dismiss the Kohler v. Martin opinion as 
"unhelpful" because there is no discussion of the merits of the 
constitutional argument or the manner in which it was raised. 
It is respectfully submitted that exactly the opposite is 
true; the issue is so obviously without merit that no discussion 
need even occur. 
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POINT II 
THE "DEDICATION BY USE" STATUTES, SECTION 
27-12-89 AND 90, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, DO NOT 
EFFECT AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING VIOLATING 
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AND ARTTCLE I, SECTION 22 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Section 27-12-89 of the Utah Code, which appears in a 
chapter of the Utah Code entitled "Acquisition of Property for 
Highway Purposes", provides as follows: 
"Public use constituting dedication. 
A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and 
abandoned to the use of the public when it has been 
continuously used as a public tlior oughlaie lor a per tod 
of ten years.,f 
Section 27-12-90 provides as follows: 
"Highways Once Established Continue Until Abandoned. 
All public highways once established shall continue to 
be highways until abandoned or vacated border of the 
highway authorities having such jurisdiction over any 
such highway, or by other competent authority." 
The word "highway" is defined in Section 27-12-2(6) as 
follows: 
"Highway means any public road, street, alley, lane, 
court, place, viaduct, tunnel, culvert, bridge, or 
structure laid out or erected for public use, or 
dedicated or abandoned to the public, or made public in 
an action for the partition of real property, including 
the entire area within the right-of-way." 
In determining whether or not a Utah statute is 
constitutional, Utah law on the subject is certainly the 
appropriate beginning point. Utah cases that discuss the 
constitutionality of statutes read as follows: "[t]he act is 
presumed valid, and we resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of 
constitutionality." Society of Separationists, Inc. vs. 
Whitehead, 870 P2d 916, 920 (Utah 1993) quoting from In re 
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Criminal Investigation, 754 P2d 633, 640 (Utah 1988); "statutes 
are presumed to be constitutional, and will not be invalidated 
if, resolving every reasonable doubt in favor of their 
constitutionality, there is any reasonable basis upon which they 
can be sustained." Matheson v. Ferry. 641 P2d 674, 699 (Utah 
±982); "[i]t is a well established rule of constitutional law 
that where there are two alternatives as to the interpretation of 
a statute, one of which would make its constitutionality doubtful 
and the other would render it constitutional, the latter will 
prevail-" Id.; "all doubts must be resolved in favor of 
constitutionality, and the Court is obligated to adopt any 
reasonable construction of a statute that will assure it's 
constitutionality in preference to any construction that would 
jeopardize it." Id.; "[t]he primary rule of statutory 
interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the legislature 
in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." 
Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P2d 111, 115 (Utah 1991); "it is the well-
established rule that legislative enactments are endowed with a 
strong presumption of validity; and that they should not be 
declared unconstitutional if there is any reasonable basis upon 
which they can be found to come within the constitutional 
framework; and that a statute will not be stricken down as being 
unconstitutional unless it appears to be so beyond a reasonable 
doubt." Greaves v. State, 528 P2d 805, 806 (Utah 1974); "statute 
will not be declared unconstitutional... if under any sensible 
interpretation of its language it can be given practical effect." 
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Id.; ,f[a] statute is presumed constitutional, and 'we resolve any 
reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality.f» Board of 
Com'rs, Utah State Bar vs. Petersen, 937 P2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 
L997) . 
The District Court denied the Appellee landowner's motion 
for summary judgment on the constitutionality/takings issue and 
granted the Appellant Countyfs cross-motion for summary judgment 
on the same issue on February 13, 1997. Record 164-75. Appellee 
misunderstands the statutes regarding the character of the 
governmental action by describing it as being a permanent 
physical, occupation of properly by the government. it was the 
public that continuously used the road for ten years or more as a 
public thoroughfare. That fact, and that fact alone, caused the 
invocation of Sections 27-12-89 and 90, Utah Code Annotated, with 
the result being a highway deemed to have been dedicated and 
abandoned to the use of the public. The highway has been 
dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public due to 
circumstances, and the passage of time, not because of some 
governmental action. Moreover, the property in guestion has been 
used as a road for several decades and its general shape and 
appearance has remained the same during that time period. The 
act that brought this lawsuit was the gating of the road in 1997 
by Appellees. 
The challenged statutes do not constitute regulation or 
taking which is compensable. See Colman vs. Utali State Land 
Board, 795 P2d 622 (Utah, 1990). 
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In Colman, the plaintiff owned and operated a mineral 
extraction business utilizing brine from the Great Salt Lake, and 
in connection with the business owned an easement to operate an 
underwater brine canal parallel to the Great Salt Lake causeway. 
The State breached the causeway during the flooding in 1984, 
and Colman1s claim for damages arising from that action was 
dismissed at the trial court level. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court addressed, among other 
things, the issues of whether or not Colman had a protected 
property interest and whether it was either taken or damaged 
within the meaning of Article 1, Section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution, which provides as follows: 
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without just compensation." 
The Court also examined whether or not the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity barred ColmanTs suit, in the absence of formal 
condemnation proceedings. 
The Supreme Court found that Colmanfs lease and easement 
were indeed recognized property interests, and were protected 
under the applicable constitutional provision. The Court then 
discussed whether or not that interest was either "taken" or 
"damaged" within the meaning of the just compensation clause. 
The Court defined a taking as "any substantial interference 
with private property which destroys or materially lessens its 
value, or by which the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is 
in any substantial degree abridged or destroyed." (Colman at 
Page 6 26). 
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The Court defined damage as "definite physical injury 
cognizable to the senses with a perceptible effect on the present 
market value." (Colman at Page 626). 
Regarding damages, the Court furthpr stated: 
"Damages to land, by the construction of a pubJic or 
industrial improvement, though no part thereof is taken 
as provided for under 78-34-10(3), contrary to the rule 
for severance damages, is limited to injuries that 
would be actionable at common law, or where there has 
been some physical disturbance of a right, either 
public or private, which the owner enjoys in connection 
with his property and which gives it additional value, 
and which causes him to sustain a special damage with 
respect to his property in excess of that sustained by 
the public generally." (Colman at Page 626). 
The Colman court also tilled that regardless of whether or 
not property was taken through eminent domain or "merely 
regulated" under the State's police powers, Colman possessed a 
just compensation claim under Article 1, Section 22. The Court 
stated: 
"Rather, the issue is whether sufficient facts were 
alleged to show a taking of property." (Colman at Page 
628) . 
The challenged code sections, as noted above, are not 
regulatory; no government action is involved. Appellees 
themselves created the road. The event or events which caused 
the road to become public was public usage coupled with the 
passage of time. 
Furthermore, since the landowners themse]ves created and use 
these roads, as Appellees established at trial, by no stretch of 
the imagination can public use destroy or materiaJly lessen the 
value of the road property itself, nor is the owner's right to 
use of and enjoyment of the roads abridged or destroyed. 
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Appellees cannot demonstrate any definite physical injury 
cognizable to the senses; the road was there during the ten-year 
statutory period, and remains afterward, in the same location, 
with the same width. 
No severance damages are allowable under Colman, so the 
issue is limited to damages to the roadway property itself. A 
roadway is not damaged by leaving it a roadway; if nothing is 
changed, no damage is possible. 
Furthermore, the public trust doctrine prohibits the 
awarding of any compensation. 
In Colman the Court discussed, beginning at Page 635, the 
so-called public trust doctrine. 
At trial, the State argued, and the trial court held, that 
the breaching of the causeway was in furtherance of the State's 
public trust responsibilities and therefore the State could not 
be liable for the damage done to Colmanfs canal. The State 
maintained that it could take any action relating to the Great 
Salt Lake that was in the public interest and be immune from 
liability, while Colman argued that the public trust doctrine did 
not apply to flood control, but only to other things such as 
recreational use and preservation of ecological .integrity. 
The Supreme Court remanded this issue, stating that it was a 
question of fact to be decided by the trial court, since the 
State had exercised its public trust powers in leasing the canal 
to Colman, and thereafter attempted to revoke that grant without 
compensation. 
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In a subsequent case, National Parks and Conservation 
Association vs. Board of State Lands, 869 P2d 909 (Utah 1993), 
the Supreme Court, at Page 919, clarified the Colman case 
further, stating: 
"The 'public trust1 doctrine discussed in Colman vs. 
Utah State Land Board, 795 P2d 622, 635-36 (Utah 1990), 
protects the ecological integrity of public lands and 
their public recreational uses for the benefit of the 
public at large. The public trust doctrine, however, 
is limited to sovereign lands and perhaps other State 
lands that are not subject to specific trusts, such as 
school trust lands. (Citations omitted) Thus, the 
beneficiaries and the purposes of the public trust and 
the school land trust are different." 
The essence of the instant case is that the roadways in 
question lead to public land, which is used mostly for 
recreational uses, particularly hunting. 
It is respectfully submitted that the public trust doctrine 
includes or should include federal public lands within the State 
which are available for public recreational purposes, and 
therefore no damages may be awarded. 
There is no protected property interest. The roads involved 
in this case were created by the property owners, for their own 
u^e and benefit, and continue to be used for such purposes. 
There is no government action, regulation, statute, or any 
government sponsored event giving rise to the alleged taking. 
The situation is simply a matter of the public driving on roads 
created by the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' lack of diligence in 
preventing public access and the public's use of the roadways do 
not constitute any sort of governmental action as contemplated by 
federal case law, the Utah Constitution, or state case law. The 
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County is merely requesting the Court to formalize what already 
exists, i.e., a public right to traverse the plaintiff's property 
on the designated roadways. 
There is no economic impact on plaintiffs' property. 
Plaintiffs created the roadways, the public use in no way affects 
plaintiffs continued use of their property as it was contemplated 
and as it was used up to the point in time when the roadways 
became dedicated. 
The character and potential use of plaintiffs' property is 
not altered by the roadways. In fact, the roadways were and are 
an integral part of plaintiffs' use of the property. 
This case utterly fails the basic test applied in Colman v. 
Utah State Land Board, to determine if a compensable "taking" has 
occurred: 
1. The plaintiffs have no protected property interest, 
because the road already exists for their own purposes. 
2. The character of the alleged government action is merely 
to continue what has already been occurring. There is no new 
"government action". 
3. There is no economic impact on the property - in fact, 
public maintenance of the roadway is a benefit to the landowners. 
4. The character and potential use of the property is not 
changed - the road is already there. 
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CONCLUSION 
The claim of unconstitutionality is without merit. 
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